MICHAEL GOLDSWORTHY'S LEGAL BATTLE IN LONDON: JUDGE DENIES CHALLENGE OVER HOUSING DELAY
On Friday, September 22, 2017, a significant legal decision was made in the High Court concerning Michael Goldsworthy, a convicted sex offender residing in London.Judge Gilbart refused to grant permission for Mr Goldsworthy to pursue a lawsuit against the London Borough of Richmond upon Thames, claiming that their delay in providing him with suitable housing had contributed to the postponement of his release from prison.
Michael Goldsworthy, who was convicted of serious sexual offenses, was sentenced to life imprisonment in January 2006, with a minimum term of four years.
His case is further complicated by his severe disability, which necessitates the use of a wheelchair.
Despite becoming eligible for early release on parole in October 2009, Mr Goldsworthy remained incarcerated until May 2017, a delay that he attributed to the housing issues faced by the authorities.
In April 2017, Mr Goldsworthy initiated judicial review proceedings against several entities, including the Parole Board of England and Wales, the Secretary of State for Justice, the London Borough of Wandsworth, and the London Borough of Richmond upon Thames.
His primary contention was that the failure to promptly identify and secure appropriate accommodation for him had directly caused the delay in his release from prison.
Notably, shortly after the claim was filed, Richmond managed to find suitable housing, which ultimately facilitated Mr Goldsworthy’s release.
His legal argument against the London Boroughs centered on their alleged failure to fulfill their obligations under the Care Act 2014 and the Housing Act 1996.
He claimed that this failure had contributed significantly to the delay in his release.
In November 2016, Richmond acknowledged that they owed Mr Goldsworthy the primary housing duty.
However, they argued that despite their efforts, suitable accommodation could not be secured until May 2017, citing the complexity of his case due to his risk profile and disability-related needs.
Richmond contended that the unique circumstances of Mr Goldsworthy’s case made it exceptionally challenging to find appropriate housing earlier.
They maintained that their efforts, although diligent, were limited by the market conditions and the specific needs of the individual.
The court also considered the broader policy implications, balancing interests of liberty, public safety, and resource allocation.
The judge noted that in a liberal democracy, liberty must be prioritized, and that the fact a non-disabled person might have been housed more quickly did not automatically imply discrimination, especially since the delay was not attributed to any policy or practice of Richmond.
Furthermore, the court examined the claim under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to respect for private and family life.
Citing the Supreme Court case R (McDonald) v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC, the judge highlighted that states have a wide margin of appreciation to balance individual rights against community interests, including resource limitations.
Consequently, the court found that the claim under Article 8 was unlikely to succeed.
Permission to proceed with the case against the Parole Board and the Secretary of State was granted on the papers by Justice Green.
However, permission was denied concerning the London Boroughs of Wandsworth and Richmond upon Thames.
Mr Goldsworthy subsequently renewed his application for permission to sue Richmond, asserting two main grounds: that the failure to provide suitable housing constituted indirect discrimination or a failure to make reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act 2010, and that it breached his rights under Article 8 of the ECHR.
The judge, Gilbart J, delivered an oral judgment at the renewal hearing, ruling that both grounds were unlikely to succeed.
He emphasized that the case involved complex policy considerations, including the competing interests of individual liberty, public safety, and the fair distribution of resources.
While acknowledging the importance of these factors, the judge reiterated that liberty remains a paramount concern in a liberal democracy.
He also pointed out that the delay in housing was not necessarily due to discrimination but could be explained by market conditions, which are outside the control of local authorities.
Regarding the alleged breach of Article 8, the judge referenced the precedent set in R (McDonald) v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC, which affirms that authorities have a broad margin of appreciation to balance individual rights with societal needs, including resource constraints.
As a result, the claim under Article 8 was deemed unlikely to succeed.
Legal representation for the London Boroughs of Wandsworth and Richmond upon Thames was provided by Matt Hutchings QC, who argued that the case lacked sufficient grounds to proceed further.
The court’s decision underscores the complex interplay between individual rights, public safety, and local authority responsibilities in the context of housing and criminal justice in London.
